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When What You Know 
Ain’t Necessarily So: 
A Comparative Analysis 
 of Texas Foundation 
School Program 
Revenues for 
Independent and Charter 
School Districts1 
R. Anthony Rolle and R. Craig Wood
Texas charter school districts (CSDs) are accredited and moni-
tored by the Texas Education Agency (TEA) utilizing the various 
components within the state accountability systems for both state 
and federal requirements. Yet, Texas CSDs are believed to operate 
with few regulatory restrictions on administrative, instructional, and 
pedagogical methods. Texas independent school districts (ISDs) and 
charter school districts are subject to some TEA-required admin-
istrative, instructional, and pedagogical standards. Despite these 
commonalities, to-date no independent fiscal analysis of ISD-CSD 
revenue distributions has been conducted. As such, the purpose of 
this article is to conduct comparative analyses of revenues gener-
ated from the Texas Foundation School Program (FSP) for ISDs and 
CSDs. As part of this analysis, Texas funding formula components 
for ISDs and CSDs were analyzed to assess and compare overall 
revenue generation levels, levels of equity exhibited by revenue 
distributions, and demographic and financial data.
An Explanation of the Texas Public School District  
Funding Mechanism
Public schools in Texas receive state revenue funds based on the 
average daily attendance of students. The Texas school funding 
formula, called the Texas Foundation School Program (FSP), is the 
source of state funding for all Texas school districts.2,3  In its current 
form, the FSP is meant to ensure that all school districts, regardless 
of property wealth, receive "substantially equal access to similar 
revenue per student at similar tax effort." 4  In fact, the major differ-
ences between ISDs and CSDs are that CSDs do not receive funds 
from local tax revenue sources and do not have access to state 
facilities allotments.
The FSP funding formula originally was designed to generate 
substantially equal revenues for school district daily maintenance 
and operation–not capital or debt servicing–expenses. (See Ap-
pendix A.) Comprised of three funding sections, Tier I of the FSP is 
structured as a basic foundation formula, consisting of a basic allot-
ment per student and a series of weighted adjustments that account 
for differences in student and district characteristics, e.g., popula-
tion density or the percentage of students labeled as economically 
disadvantaged within a district.5 In addition to these components, 
each district qualifies for transportation allotments based on the 
number of students riding buses divided by the approved route 
miles. As such, the basic allotments plus the district, student, and 
transportation adjustments sum to provide a district’s per student 
state allocation within Tier I. This amount is adjusted by a district’s 
“Local Fund Assignment,” i.e., revenue generated through local taxa-
tion at a specific rate. Consequently, adjusted state aid equals the 
Tier I Entitlement minus the Local Fund Assignment.
Tier II operates as a guaranteed-yield funding mechanism. Unlike 
Tier I, Tier II state revenue is generated based on the maintenance 
and operation tax rates set by local districts. For example, every 
cent of tax the district levies is guaranteed to receive a specified 
dollar amount per weighted student.  (See Appendix B.) Under a 
third section for facilities, informally known as Tier III, revenues 
for capital and debt services, i.e., “Interest and Sinking,” or I&S, 
rates, are unadjusted formulaically. However, three state programs–
“Existing Debt Allotment” (EDA), “Instructional Facilities Allotment” 
(IFA), and “New Instructional Facilities Allotment” (NIFA)–are 
designed to assist districts with these types of costs. Nonetheless, 
districts bear the primary responsibility for facilities costs that typi-
cally are funded through voter-approved property tax assessments.
While the preponderance of education revenues generated by the 
FSP are represented by this three-part funding system, state revenue 
generation is affected by one more major feature of the funding 
mechanism referred to as “Fiscal Recapture.” The recapture provi-
sion of Texas’s school finance program requires districts with prop-
erty tax wealth per “Weighted Average Daily Attendance” (WADA) 
above the 88th percentile (known as Chapter 41 districts) to share 
the local wealth by choosing one of five options:
(1) Consolidate with a poorer school district.
(2) Detach property to another school district for taxation 
purposes.
(3) Purchase average daily attendance credits from the state.
(4) Contract for the education of nonresident students by 
partnering with a poorer district.
(5) Consolidate the tax base with one or more other dis-
tricts.
Most Chapter 41 districts, which comprise less than 15% of all 
districts, choose either the third or fourth option. 
For CSDs, on the other hand, the FSP calculates revenues based 
on an average adjusted allotment–a value that is ubiquitous to all 
CSDs–not a specific district-based adjusted allotment. Specifically, 
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this statewide average adjusted allotment is applied to all individual 
CSDs regardless of school size, level of sparsity among students 
living in the district, and cost of education differentials that vary by 
CSD. Two more items are important to note:  CSDs do not receive 
I&S fund revenues, and, contrary to popular belief, CSDs may 
choose to receive transportation funding, though not all choose to 
do so.6  It is with the understanding of these differences in revenue 
generation formulas that forms the context for the analysis in this 
examination.
Description of Methodological and Data Analysis  
Techniques
Data analyzed were obtained, defined, calculated, and reported 
from one primary source–the Public Education Information Manage-
ment System (PEIMS) managed by the TEA. The data elements 
were combined state-local revenues from general fund sources 
(excludes all I&S revenues), combined state-local revenues from all 
fund sources (includes all I&S revenues), and district and student 
characteristics defined by specific components within the FSP, e.g., 
maintenance and operations taxing effort. 
Statistical analyses focused on these data elements because the 
Texas state funding mechanism is in place to distribute resources 
equitably while reducing the influence of individual district wealth 
and various student needs. Univariate and multivariate statistical 
analyses were conducted to examine operationalized variables and 
equity relationships for Texas ISDs and CSDs for the 2005 to 2009 
academic years. Univariate statistics – means, medians, standard 
deviations, ranges, and percentiles–were used to provide general 
descriptions of individual variables. Standard equity statistics–per-
centile ratios and coefficients of variation–were used to determine 
levels of horizontal equity.7  Multivariate statistical analyses were 
conducted to examine operationalized variables and efficacy rela-
tionships for Texas school districts over the same period.8  Standard-
ized beta coefficients from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analyses were used to make inferences concerning the effects of 
various district characteristics on spending and their influence on 
levels of combined state and local expenditures per student. 
Equity Outcomes of the Current Utilized FSP Components
From 2005 to 2009, average combined state and local education 
revenue per weighted student for all ISDs increased from $4,779 to 
$5,954–an annual average gain of 5.7% over the five-year period. 
(See Table 1.) Median combined state and local education revenue 
per weighted student experienced similar increases. While the 
standard deviation increased throughout the period examined, the 
coefficient of variation also increased from 0.158 to 0.199–an annual 
average gain of 7.1%. Analyzing horizontal measures that examine 
percentile ratios, the 95th to 5th ratio showed an average annual 
increase of 2.7%; the 90th to 10th ratio showed an average annual 
increase of 2.9%; and the 75th to 25th ratio showed a slight average 
annual increase of 0.8%. Even though statistical evidence showed 
slow degeneration in levels of equity, high expenditure ISDs still 
spent as much as 1.6 times more than their low expenditure coun-
terparts. Therefore, even the though the average combined state 
Table 1
Horizontal Equity Statistics for All Texas Public School Districts:
Combined State and Local Education Revenue per Weighted Student, 2005-2009
Year
General Fund Revenues All Fund Revenuew










Mean 4,779 4,934 5,111 5,731 5,954 5.71 5,209 5,390 5,595 6,262 6,602 6.16
Median 4,704 4,787 4,954 5,407 5,653 4.74 5,115 5,206 5,425 5,960 6,270 5.26
Standard Deviation 756 1,003 928 1,199 1,185 13.31 897 1,187 1,078 1,335 1,542 15.62
Coefficient of  
Variation
0.158 0.203 0.182 0.209 0.199 7.04 0.172 0.220 0.193 0.213 0.234 8.90
Percentile:
95 5,857 6,336 6,446 7,781 7,943 8.18 6809 7106 7280 8768 9024 7.54
90 5,304 5,622 5,811 6,761 7,060 7.53 6150 6431 6611 7597 8039 7.03
75 4,960 5,059 5,267 5,912 6,189 5.76 5505 5662 5869 6598 6919 5.95
25 4,454 4,573 4,747 5,147 5,379 4.85 4719 4844 5018 5546 5827 5.46
10 4,145 4,239 4,479 4,927 4,927 4.48 4364 4473 4736 5204 5510 6.03
5 3,884 3,995 4,228 4,748 4,748 5.25 4044 4205 4457 4954 5233 6.69
Percentile Ratios:
95/5 1.508 1.586 1.525 1.639 1.673 2.72 1.684 1.690 1.633 1.770 1.724 0.70
90/10 1.280 1.326 1.297 1.372 1.433 2.91 1.409 1.438 1.396 1.460 1.459 0.91
75/25 1.114 1.106 1.110 1.149 1.151 0.83 1.167 1.169 1.170 1.190 1.187 0.45
n 1,037 1,033 1,031 1,031 1,030 1,037 1,033 1,031 1,031 1,030
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and local education revenue per weighted student increased in real 
terms during the five-year period examined, levels of inequity in-
creased.9  Examining revenues from all funds yielded similar results.
From 2005 to 2009, average combined state and local education 
revenue per weighted student for all CSDs increased from $4,474 
to $5,269–an annual average gain of 4.4% over the five-year period. 
(See Table 2.) Median combined state and local education revenue 
per weighted student experienced similar increases. While the 
standard deviation decreased throughout the period examined, the 
coefficient of variation also decreased from 0.431 to 0.166.10  Ana-
lyzing horizontal measures that examine percentile ratios, the 95th 
to 5th ratio showed an average annual decrease of 4.7%; the 90th 
to 10th ratio showed an average annual decrease of 3.4%; and, the 
75th to 25th ratio showed a slight average annual decrease of 1.8%. 
Moreover, even though statistical evidence showed slow improve-
ments in levels of equity, high expenditure CSDs still spent as much 
as 1.5 times more than low expenditure counterparts. Therefore, as 
average combined state and local education revenue per weighted 
student increased in real terms during the five-year period exam-
ined, levels of equity increased slightly. Examining revenues from all 
funds yielded similar results.
Table 3 compares mean differences in combined state and local 
revenues per student–as well as district and student demographic 
characteristics–between ISDs and CSDs 2005-2009. Traditional ISDs 
received an average of $601 more in combined state and local  
general fund revenue per WADA over the five-year period and 
$1,539 more per ADA (Average Daily Attendance) than CSDs. When 
Table 2
Horizontal Equity Statistics for All Texas Charter School Districts:
Combined State and Local Education Revenue per Weighted Student, 2005-2009
Year
General Fund Revenues All Funds Revenue










Mean 4,474 4,776 4,471 4,955 5,269 4.38 4,640 5,023 4,643 5,155 5,475 4.48
Median 4,307 4,455 4,455 4,976 5,285 5.34 4,446 4.624 4.730 5.198 5.437 5.20
Standard Deviation 1,929 4,491 985 872 875 10.90 1,901 4,583 1,018 933 931 13.68
Coefficient of  
Variation
0.431 0.940 0.220 0.176 0.166 3.94 0.410 0.912 0.219 0.181 0.170 5.81
Percentile:
95 5,992 5,743 5,777 6,245 6,323 1.45 6,283 6.611 5,898 6,564 6,649 1.76
90 5,243 5,275 5,280 5,866 5,972 3.40 5,510 5,715 5,433 6,099 6,335 3.73
75 4,723 4,810 4,890 5,246 5,532 4.06 4,847 5,015 5,068 5,517 6,731 8.85
25 3,963 4,146 4,220 4,708 5,002 6.05 4,055 4,323 4,394 4,866 5,172 6.32
10 3,512 3,695 3,888 4,264 4,607 7.04 3,607 3,789 4,004 4,348 4,847 7.70
5 3,130 3,402 2,928 3,669 4,138 8.21 3,233 3,457 3,462 3,711 4,239 7.12
Percentile Ratios:
95/5 1.914 1.688 1.973 1.702 1.528 -4.73 1.943 1.912 1.704 1.769 1.569 -5.00
90/10 1.493 1.428 1.358 1.376 1.296 -3.43 1.528 1.508 1.357 1.403 1.307 -3.69
75/25 1.192 1.160 1.159 1.114 1.106 -1.84 1.195 1.160 1.153 1.134 1.301 2.39
n 86 186 177 187 192 86 186 177 187 192
examining state and combined educational revenue from all funds, 
ISDs received an average of $939 more in combined state and local 
all fund revenue per WADA over the five-year period and $2,009 
more per ADA than CSDs. Concomitantly, ISDs tended to service 
five percentage points more students receiving gifted/talented  
services, and nine percentage points more students receiving 
vocational education services than CSDs. Specifically, from 2005 to 
2009, 6.7% of all students in ISDs–compared to 1.7% of all students 
in charter school districts–received gifted/talented services; and, 
24.3% of all students in ISDs–compared to 15.4% of all students in 
CSDs–received vocational education services.
On the other hand, even while receiving less revenue, CSDs 
provided educational services to equivalent percentages of stu-
dents receiving special education services, three percentage points 
more students receiving bilingual educational services, and over 15 
percentage points more students classified as economically disad-
vantaged. Specifically, from 2005 to 2009, 12.0% of all students in 
CSDs–compared to 12.3%  of all students in independent school 
districts–received special education services; 10.3% of all students 
in CSDs–compared to 7.2% of all students in independent school 
districts–received bilingual education services; and, 68.6% of all 
students in CSDs–compared to 53.0% of all students in independent 
school districts–received additional education services for economi-
cally disadvantaged students.
The analyses to this point have compared all ISDs to all CSDs. 
Accordingly, these analyses also would include high enrollment 
districts, e.g., Austin ISD, El Paso ISD, Houston ISD, and compare 
3
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Table 3
Analysis of Mean Differences in Revenues per Student and Demographic Characterstics:
All Texas Public School Districts Minus All Charter School Districts, 2005-2009
Year
General Fund Revenues All Fund Revenues










305 --- 639 776 685 601 569 --- 951 1,107 1,127 939
Combined State 
and Local ADA
1,347 1,493 1,646 1,712 1,498 1,539 1,755 1,839 2,108 2,195 2,148 2,009
Bilingual (%) -3.2 -3.3 -3.0 -2.5 -3.6 -3.1 -3.2 -3.3 -3.0 -2.5 -3.6 -3.1
Economically  
Disadvantaged (%)
-15.2 -15.7 -16.1 -15.4 -15.4 -15.6 -15.2 -15.7 -16.1 -15.4 -15.4 -15.6
Gifted and  
Talented (%)
6.0 5.6 4.9 4.3 4.3 5.0 6.0 5.6 4.9 4.3 4.3 5.0
Special Education 
(%)
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Vocational  
Education (%)
5.9 7.2 10.1 10.9 10.8 9.0 5.9 7.2 10.1 10.9 10.8 9.0
n (Charter schools) 185 186 178 187 192 185 1863 178 187 192
n (School districts) 1,037 1,033 1,031 1,031 1,030 1,037 1,033 1,031 1,031 1,030
Note: WADA = Weighted Average Daily Attendance. ADA = Average Daily Attendance.
Table 4
Horizontal Equity Statistics for Charter-Size-Equivalent Texas Public School Districts:
Combined State and Local Education Revenue per Weighted Student, 2005-2009
Year
General Revenue Fund All Revenues Fund










Mean 4,733 4,916 5,119 5,804 6,031 6.32 5,066 5,278 5,494 6,218 6,564 6.75
Median 4,638 4,734 4,921 5,424 5,704 5.35 4,911 5,044 5,286 5,824 6,177 5.94
Standard Deviation 881 1,165 1,066 1,385 1,353 12.84 982 1,341 1,193 1,507 1,744 16.89
Coefficient of  
Variation
0.19 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.22 5.95 0.19 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.27 9.44
Percentile:
95 6,272 6,756 6,965 8,399 8,433 7.95 6,933 7,445 7,504 9,033 9,348 8.01
90 5,502 5,759 5,997 7,093 7,297 7.49 5,925 6,330 6,562 7,799 8,191 8.59
75 4,910 5,030 5,293 6,037 6,288 6.47 5,327 5,472 5,726 6,493 6,877 6.67
25 4,351 4,484 4,665 5,112 5,362 5.39 4,558 4,696 4,916 5,446 5,731 5.93
10 3,991 4,130 4,370 4,831 5,063 6.16 4,193 4,332 4,632 5,066 5,378 6.44
5 3,708 3,870 4,099 4,633 4,833 6.91 3,935 4,064 4,333 4,808 5,079 6.62
Percentile Ratios:
95/5 1.69 1.75 1.70 1.81 1.74 0.87 1.76 1.83 1.73 1.88 1.84 1.24
90/10 1.38 1.39 1.37 1.47 1.44 1.18 1.41 1.46 1.42 1.54 1.52 1.99
75/25 1.13 1.12 1.13 1.18 1.17 0.98 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.19 1.20 0.67
n 680 715 708 707 707 680 715 708 707 707
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them to relatively low enrollment charter school districts. Under-
standing that certain economies of scale may influence comparative 
analyses, supplemental analyses of “charter equivalent” districts, 
i.e., ISDs that had enrollment less than or equal to the highest 
enrollment CSD, also were conducted to support or question the all-
inclusive analytical results. The analytical results presented for the 
charter equivalent districts mirrored the results of the all ISD and all 
CSD analyses.
From 2005 to 2009, among charter size equivalent ISDs, average 
combined state and local education revenue per weighted student 
increased from $4,733 to $6,031–an annual average gain of 6.3% 
over the five-year period. (See Table 4.) Median combined state and 
local education revenue per weighted student experienced similar 
increases. While the standard deviation increased throughout the 
period examined, the coefficient of variation also increased from 
0.186 to 0.224–an annual average gain of almost 6.0%. Analyzing 
horizontal measures that examined percentile ratios, the 95th to 5th 
ratio showed an average annual increase of 0.9%; the 90th to 10th 
ratio showed an average annual increase of 1.2%; and the 75th to 
25th ratio showed a slight average annual increase of 1.0%. Even 
though statistical evidence showed slow degeneration in levels of 
equity, high expenditure ISDs still spent as much as 1.7 times more 
than their low expenditure counterparts. Therefore, although the 
average combined state and local education revenue per weighted 
student increased in real terms during the five-year period exam-
ined, levels of inequity increased. Examining revenues from all funds 
yielded similar results.
Table 5 compares mean differences in combined state and local 
revenues per student for charter size equivalent ISDs and CSDs, 
as well as district and student demographic characteristics, from 
2005-2009. Traditional ISDs received an average of $760 more in 
combined state and local general fund revenue per WADA over 
the five-year period–and $2,241 more per ADA–than CSDs. When 
examining state and combined educational revenue from all funds, 
ISDs received an average of $862 more in combined state and local 
all fund revenue per WADA over the five-year period–and $2,625 
more per ADA–than CSDs. Concomitantly, ISDs tended to service 
five percentage points more students receiving gifted/talented ser-
vices and ten percentage points more student receiving vocational 
services than CSDs. Specifically, from 2005 to 2009, 6.6% of all 
students in ISDs–compared to 1.6% of all students in charter school 
districts–received gifted/talented services; and, 25.6% of all stu-
dents in ISDs–compared to 15.4% of all students in charter school 
districts–received vocational education services.
Despite receiving less revenue, CSDs provided educational service 
to equivalent percentages of students receiving special education 
services, five percentage points more students receiving bilingual 
educational services, and over 15 percentage points more students 
classified as economically disadvantaged. Specifically, from 2005 
to 2009, 12.8% of all students in CSDs–compared to 12.1% of all 
students in independent school districts–received special education 
services; 10.2% of all students in CSDs–compared to 5.4% of all 
students in independent school districts–received bilingual educa-
tion services; and, 68.6% of all students in CSDs–compared to 
53.0% of all students in independent school districts–received ad-
ditional education services for economically disadvantaged students.
An Efficacy Analysis of FSP Components  
From 2005 to 2009, the strongest predictor of combined state 
and local general fund revenue per pupil was assessed valuation. 
Table 5
Analysis of Mean Differences in Revenues per Student and Demographic Characterstics:
All Similarly Sized Public School Districts Minus Texas Charter School Districts, 2005-2009
Year
General Fund Revenues All Fund Revenues










--- --- 650 853 776 --- 426 --- 851 1,067 1,102 862
Combined State 
and Local ADA
1,984 2,101 2,312 2,517 2,292 2,241 2,314 2,368 2,679 2,901 2,863 2,625
Bilingual (%) -4.80 -4.90 -4.60 -4.30 -5.50 -4.82 -4.80 -4.90 -4.60 -4.30 -5.50 -4.82
Economically  
Disadvantaged (%)
-14.80 -15.40 -16.20 -15.60 -16.00 -15.60 -14.80 -15.40 -16.20 -15.60 -16.00 -15.60
Gifted and  
Talented (%)
6.10 5.50 4.80 4.10 4.10 4.92 6.10 5.50 4.80 4.10 4.10 4.92
Special Education 
(%)
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Vocational  
Education (%)
6.8 8.1 11.5 12.2 12.2 10.2 6.8 8.1 11.5 12.2 12.2 10.2
n (Charter schools) 184 186 173 181 185 184 186 173 181 185
n (School districts) 680 715 708 707 707 680 715 708 707 707
Note: WADA = Weighted Average Daily Attendance. ADA = Average Daily Attendance.
5
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The full model exhibited an adjusted R-square of 58.5% with 35.3 
percentage points solely accounted for by assessed value and M&O 
rate, i.e., over 60% of the explained variation shown in revenue 
was caused by changes in assessed valuation. The standardized 
beta coefficients ranged from 0.450 up to 0.576, and these were 
statistically significant for all years examined. (See Table 6.) The 
second strongest predictor–the sparsity adjustment controlling for 
low enrollment ISDs–reflected coefficients ranging from 0.230 up to 
0.309, and these were statistically significant for all years examined. 
The third strongest predictor–transportation costs–had coefficients 
ranging from 0.195 up to 0.277, and these were statistically signifi-
cant for all years examined.
Other significant predictors of combined state and local gen-
eral fund revenue per pupil were percentage of students receiving 
vocational education services, the small-mid-size adjustment which 
also controls for low enrollment districts, and average beginning 
teacher salary. Here, it is important to note that average beginning 
teacher salary actually had an inverse relationship to revenue. There 
were no consistent statistically significant relationships between 
combined state and local general fund revenue per pupil and district 
M&O taxing effort nor percentages of gifted/talented, bilingual, or 
economically disadvantaged students. Overall, the magnitude of 
the influence for assessed valuation was nearly twice as strong as 
the second strongest predictor. Examining revenues from all funds 
yielded similar results.
For charter size equivalent ISDs, the strongest predictor of 
combined state and local general fund revenue per pupil also was 
assessed valuation from 2005 to 2009. (See Table 7.) The full model 
exhibited an adjusted R-square of 53.8% with 35.9 percentage 
points solely accounted for by assessed value and M&O rate, i.e., 
approximately 67% of the explained variation shown in revenue is 
caused by changes in assessed valuation. The standardized beta co-
efficient ranged from 0.466 up to 0.612, and these were statistically 
significant for all years. The second strongest predictor–the sparsity 
adjustment controlling for low enrollment ISDs–had coefficients 
ranging from 0.223 up to 0.301; and, these were statistically signifi-
cant for all years examined. The third strongest predictor–transpor-
tation costs–had coefficients ranging from 0.201 up to 0.292, and  
these were statistically significant for all years examined. To a lesser 
extent, the percentage of students receiving vocational educational 
services was the only other statistically significant predictor of reve-
nues. Overall, the magnitude of the influence for assessed valuation 
was more than twice as strong as the second strongest predictor. 
Examining revenues from all funds yielded similar results.
Table 6
Analysis of Texas FSP Components for All Texas Public School Districts in
















































2005 0.096 0.454 0.065 0.077 --- 0.140 0.094 -0.150 0.225 0.085 0.309 115.357 0.573 0.291
2006 --- 0.483 --- 0.083 0.081 0.103 0.106 -0.116 0.195 0.077 0.254 93.413 0.522 0.318
2007 --- 0.450 --- --- --- 0.058 0.145 -0.061 0.277 0.124 0.244 107.080 0.556 0.323
2008 --- 0.576 0.068 --- --- 0.062 0.168 -0.140 0.204 0.102 0.240 169.391 0.665 0.444
2009 --- 0.507 --- --- --- --- 0.168 -0.082 0.267 0.121 0.230 130.774 0.610 0.389
Average LPP 0.494 LPP LPP LPP 0.091 0.136 -0.110 0.234 0.102 0.255 123.203 0.585 0.353
















































2005 0.058 0.472 0.075 --- 0.053 0.139 0.102 -0.074 0.216 0.068 0.037 105.588 0.551 0.332
2006 --- 0.533 --- --- 0.081 0.083 0.103 -0.083 0.183 --- 0.239 95.433 0.527 0.379
2007 0.056 0.501 --- --- --- 0.058 0.131 --- 0.273 0.100 0.224 110.678 0.564 0.380
2008 --- 0.614 0.090 --- --- 0.060 0.150 -0.099 0.201 0.083 0.218 164.055 0.657 0.493
2009 --- 0.528 --- --- --- --- 0.146 --- 0.265 0.076 0.179 103.419 0.552 0.406
Average LPP 0.530 LPP LPP LPP 0.085 0.126 LPP 0.228 0.082 0.179 115.835 0.570 0.398
All Funds Revenues: Standardized Regression Coefficients
Note:  M&O = Maintenance and Operations.
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Five findings were of particular note: (1) The strongest predictor 
of combined state and local general fund revenue per pupil was 
assessed valuation; (2) The FSP components representing percent-
ages of students receiving bilingual services were an insignificant 
predictor of expenditures per student; (3) The FSP components 
representing percentages of students receiving gifted and talented 
services were an insignificant predictor of expenditures per student; 
(4) The influence of maintenance and operations taxing effort was 
a positive and negative predictor of expenditures per student; and 
(5) The influence of average teacher beginning teacher salary was a 
positive and negative predictor of expenditures per student.
Conclusions and Recommendations
In this study, Texas funding formula components for ISDs and 
CSDs were analyzed to assess and compare overall revenue genera-
tion levels, levels of equity exhibited by revenue distributions, 
and demographic and financial data. Univariate and multivariate 
statistical analyses were conducted to examine operationalized 
variables and equity relationships for Texas ISDs and CSDs dur-
ing the 2005 to 2009 academic years. Univariate statistics–means, 
medians, standard deviations, ranges, and percentiles–were used to 
provide general descriptions of individual variables. Standard equity 
statistics–percentile ratios and coefficients of variation–were used to 
determine levels of horizontal equity. When examining combined 
local-state expenditures, levels of inequity remained constant or 
worsened slightly depending on the measure analyzed. In fact, evi-
dence examined showed that disparities in per-student funding–and 
ultimately access to a variety of educational services–were driven 
primarily by the ability of school districts to generate revenues from 
local property wealth.
Additional analyses showed that traditional ISDs received an 
average of $601 more in combined state and local general fund 
revenue per WADA over the five-year period–and $1,539 more per 
ADA–than CSDs. When examining state and combined educational 
revenue from all funds, ISDs received an average of $939 more in 
combined state and local all fund revenue per WADA over the 
five-year period–and $2,009 more per ADA–than CSDs. Concomi-
tantly, traditional ISDs tended to service five percentage points 
more students receiving gifted/talented services and nine percentage 
points more student receiving vocational education services than 
CSDs. On the other hand, even while receiving less revenue, CSDs 
provided educational services to equivalent percentages of stu-
dents receiving special education services, three percentage points 
Table 7
Analysis of Texas FSP Components for Charter-Size-Equivalent Texas Public School Districts in













































2005 0.126 0.485 --- 0.071 --- 0.140 0.083 --- 0.242 n/a 0.301 65.753 0.526 0.324
2006 --- 0.499 --- 0.075 0.077 0.105 0.107 -0.064 0.201 n/a 0.254 56.317 0.474 0.260
2007 --- 0.466 --- --- --- --- 0.133 --- 0.292 n/a 0.241 63.248 0.505 0.333
2008 --- 0.612 0.071 --- --- 0.073 0.166 -0.064 0.217 n/a 0.239 102.654 0.623 0.475
2009 --- 0.532 --- --- --- --- 0.157 --- 0.286 n/a 0.223 77.103 0.562 0.402
Average LPP 0.519 LPP LPP LPP 0.091 0.129 LPP 0.248 n/a 0.252 73.015 0.538 0.359













































2005 0.088 0.496 --- --- --- 0.142 0.089 --- 0.221 n/a 0.299 66.024 0.527 0.352
2006 --- 0.550 --- --- 0.079 0.086 0.104 --- --- n/a 0.146 62.547 0.518 0.384
2007 0.072 0.516 --- --- --- --- 0.119 --- 0.279 n/a 0.219 71.820 0.538 0.389
2008 --- 0.645 0.089 --- --- 0.071 0.146 -0.053 0.205 n/a 0.214 108.838 0.637 0.515
2009 --- 0.538 --- --- --- --- 0.133 --- 0.271 n/a 0.169 65.424 0.521 0.400
Average LPP 0.549 LPP LPP LPP 0.085 0.118 LPP 0.244 n/a 0.209 74.931 0.548 0.408
All Funds Revenues: Standardized Regression Coefficients
Note:  M&O = Maintenance and Operations.
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more students receiving bilingual educational services, and over 15 
percentage points more students classified as economically disad-
vantaged.
Consequently, if education finance equity and equality of edu-
cational opportunity between traditional ISDs and CSDs were to 
remain a policy goal, the Texas school funding mechanism needs 
to be reconceptualized and restructured around two primary policy 
areas to alleviate inequities currently generated by:
1) Adjustments for fiscal capacity. The major differences 
between the ISD and CSD funding structures are: CSDs 
do not receive funds from local tax revenue sources 
and they do not receive facilities funding. These two 
items currently are components of the FSP mechanism. 
Yet, CSDs do not qualify for these revenue generation 
components.
2) Adjustments for community complexity. For CSDs, the 
FSP mechanisms generate revenues based on an average 
adjusted allotment–a value that is ubiquitous to all CSDs. 
Specifically, this average adjusted allotment is applied 
to all individual CSDs regardless of school size, level of 
sparsity among students living in the district, and cost of 
education differentials that vary by charter school district. 
The direct result of this averaging is a failure to alleviate 
negative–or reward positive–community characteristics. 
As a result, school districts with differential school climates, i.e., 
those CSDs that are not represented well by the average are being 
underfunded (or overfunded) by the state.
In its efforts to improve levels of equity in Texas, the state’s 
distribution formula is failing to counterbalance the effect of local 
spending efforts. Moreover, given that the magnitude and influence 
of local expenditures is the primary predictor for expenditure levels 
across multiple spending categories, it can be inferred that general 
levels of equity are dictated specifically by levels of local property 
values. Of particular note is the effect the influence of local expen-
ditures is having on one specific demographic subgroup–students 
receiving bilingual services. Therefore, if education finance equity 
and equality of educational opportunity are to remain a policy goal 
for the state of Texas, the Foundation School Program – and its 
structural components–needs to be reconceptualized and restruc-
tured to alleviate fiscal inequities. The ultimate goal of educational 
finance and economic research is to improve the quantity and qual-
ity of educational opportunities provided to all children. As such, in 
both a methodological and practical sense, additional comparative 
examinations of ISD and CSD funding will be necessary to continu-
ously improve academic opportunities for the children of Texas.  
Endnotes
1  This article was developed by the authors from a policy mono-
graph for the Texas Charter Schools Association, Comparative 
Analyses of Revenues Generated from the Texas Foundation School 
Program for Independent School Districts and Charter School  
Districts (February 2011).  
2  For a complete description of the Texas Foundation School  
Program, go to http://www.tea.state.tx.us/index2.aspx?id=7022.
3  For further information, go to http://www.tea.state.tx.us/index2.
aspx?id=410.
4  For information on Texas charter school funding, go to http://
www.tea.state.tx.us/index2.aspx?id=7721&menu_id=645.
5  For a more complete description of general funding formulas, see 
James W. Guthrie, Matthew G. Springer, R. Anthony Rolle, and 
Eric A. Houck, Modern Education Finance and Policy (Boston, MA: 
Allyn & Bacon, 2007); and David C. Thompson, Faith E. Crampton, 
and R. Craig Wood, Money and Schools, 5th ed. (Larchmont, NY, 
Eye on Education, 2012).
6  ISDs and CSDs also receive “Additional State Aid for Tax Reduc-
tion” (ASATR) which provides additional funding for revenue de-
creases due to rate compression changes, teacher salary increases, 
high school allotment and increases to the minimum per weighted. 
ASATR revenue provides additional levels of funding to schools 
to provide relief for tax reduction in Texas House Bill 3646 (H. B. 
3646, 2009 Leg., 81st Sess. Tx. 2009). The amount of ASATR fund-
ing received is adjusted based upon the local revenue or tax col-
lections for the schools and the per student guarantees set by the 
state. Again, the adjustments for CSDs are based on state averages. 
7  The coefficient of variation (CoV) is calculated by dividing the 
standard deviation by the mean; and, the values of the ratio range 
from 0 to +∞. As the CoV increases, inequities in revenue distribu-
tions increase.
8  For the purposes of this article, “efficacy” is defined as the  ability 
or capacity to produce desired outcomes. Operationally, each indi-
vidual element measuring a specified district, school, or individual 
policy-determined characteristic, i.e., tax rate, should have a posi-
tive, statistically significant influence on educational revenue genera-
tion. In the analysis presented in this article, only components that 
meet this criteria are detailed.  Where information is not detailed, 
the individual component failed to meet efficacy criteria.
9  It is important to note that the majority of education finance and 
economic literature report equity analyses utilizing average daily 
attendance (ADA), not weighted average daily attendance (WADA). 
The usage of WADA is unique to Texas. As such, horizontal equity 
statistics also were calculated using ADA and showed similar re-
sults. Contact the authors for details. 
10  Previously, it was mentioned that state averages were used in the 
calculation of some specific CSD revenues. This reduction in the 
magnitude of the standard deviation most likely was due to said 
policy changes.
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Texas Foundation School Program Funding Formula Adjustments 
for District and Student Characteristics
Classification Description Weight
Bilingual/ESL
Based on the number of students who participate in programs, additional funds are used for 




Based on the amount of time students spend in eligible career technology courses, additional 




Based on the number of students who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, additional 
funding assists students performing below grade level.
0.2
An additional component is utilized for program serving pregnant students. 2.41
Cost of Education 
Index
Accounts for differences in resource costs that are beyond the control of the district. The five 
components are: (1) Average beginning salary of teachers in contiguous school districts; (2) 
percent of economically disadvantaged students; (3) district size; (4) location in a rural county 
with fewer than 40,000 people; and (5) district classified as independent town or rural.
1.02 to 1.20
Gifted/Talented
Based on individual district requirements, additional funding pays for salaries and instructional 
resources. State funding is capped at 5% of each district’s ADA.
0.12
Small and Mid-Sized 
Districts
Designed to supplement higher fixed costs of operating districts in less populated areas. Small 
is less than 1,600 ADA. Mid-sized is between 1,601 to 5,000 ADA.
1.0 to 1.61
Sparsity Adjustment
Based on the number of students in district, range of grade levels available, and distance to a 
district with a high school if necessary.
Enrollment increased by 60, 
75, 0r 130
Special Education
There are 12 special education instructional arrangements with varying weights based on dura-
tion of the daily service and location of the instruction.
1.7 to 5.0
Note: Go to http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/school.finance/index.html for a complete description of the Texas FSP mechanism.
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Appendix B
Texas Foundation School Program Funding Formula Outline of 
Tier I, Tier II, and Facilities Funding Characteristics
TIER I: BASIC ALLOTMENT FUNDING
Local fund assignment:  District revenue from property tax of $.0.86 per $100 of assessed value
Basic allotment = $4,765 (for 2009-10) per ADA
Tier I entitlement = Basic allotment + district level adjustments + student level adjustments + transportation allotment
State aid to district = Tier I Entitlement - Local Fund Assignment
TIER II: GUARANTEED YIELD FUNDING
Level 1: Basic equalization
FY 2010 yield:  $59.02 per WADA; or the amount of district tax revenue per WADA percent of tax effort generated for this level of 
guaranteed yield funding for the last school year
Equalization basis:  Property tax wealth per WADA in 88th percentile of all school districts
Subject to recapture:  Yes
Requires voter approval:  No
Level 2: Above enrichment level
FY 2010 yield:  $31.95 per penny of M&O tax above enrichment level (maximum M&O tax = $1.17)
Equalization basis:  Property tax wealth per WADA in 88th percentile of all school districts
Subject to recapture:  Yes
Requires voter approval:  Yes
FACILITIES FUNDING
FY 2010 Yield  =  Property Tax Rate × Assessed Property Value
10
Educational Considerations, Vol. 39, No. 2 [2012], Art. 4
https://newprairiepress.org/edconsiderations/vol39/iss2/4
DOI: 10.4148/0146-9282.1110
